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Abstract
The paper offers an argument for a conception of legal plu-
ralism, which has some substantive upshots and at least
partly alleviates that legal pluralism may regress to rampant
relativism. In particular, I will argue that law in its pluralist
conception is inextricably linked to the requirement of public
justification. This is not by way of appealing to any tran-
scendental normative ideals but as a matter of entailment of
the very practice of law. But, perhaps to the disappointment
of many, this procedural requirement is the only practical
consequence of the concept of law. For thicker, substantive
limits to what law can do and for ways in which legal plural-
ism may be reduced in real contexts one will have to turn to
the actual circumstances furnishing the law with content
and a different kind of thinking about the law.
Keywords: legal pluralism, diversity and law, law and justifi-
cation, concept of law
1 Introduction
Theories of legal pluralism often find themselves in a
bind. Some take the observer perspective and simply
record the fact of legal pluralism remaining quiet on the
substantive question of normative interrelations
between various legal orders. This approach is open to
the critique, already familiar from non-pluralist legal
theoretical debates, that they have nothing interesting to
say about law because they fail to appreciate law’s prac-
tical character. When not accused of quietism, legal plu-
ralist theory is accused of radical scepticism about value,
precisely because it offers no way of adjudicating
between diverse legal orders or of evaluating the content
of any one of them. In response to that type of critique,
some legal pluralism theorists have appealed to context-
independent meta-law to order the legal universe. This,
however, is a slippery slope because it carries the oppo-
site risk of undermining the very foundational claim that
law is plural.
* Associate Professor of Law, Law Department, London School of Eco-
nomics and Political Science. I am grateful to Sanne Taekema and Wibo
van Rossum as well as the two anonymous referees for their helpful
critical comments. A version of this paper was presented at the School
of Law, Queen Mary University of London. I am indebted to all the par-
ticipants in that seminar and particularly to Roger Cotterrell, Ann Mum-
ford, Maskymilian del Mar, Prakash Shah, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Wayne
Morrison, Michael Lobban, Richard Nobles and David Schiff. Many
thanks also to Sean Coyle, George Pavlakos, Alexis Galan Avila and
Mariano Croce for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of the
paper. I am solely responsible for all remaining errors.
In this article, I will argue that there is one conception
of legal pluralism, which can avoid that bind. In particu-
lar, I will argue that law in that pluralist conception is
inextricably linked to the requirement of public justifi-
cation. This link is established not by appeal to some
transcendental normative ideals but as an entailment of
the very practice of law. Nevertheless, and perhaps to
the disappointment of many, this procedural require-
ment is the only practical consequence of the concept of
law. For thicker, substantive limits to what law can do
and for ways in which legal pluralism may be reduced in
real contexts one will have to turn to the actual circum-
stances furnishing the law with content and engage in a
different kind of enquiry.
2 A Pluralist Conception of
Law
Legal pluralism is generally considered to be an issue of
early modernity1 as well as a problem of the late modern
condition of globalisation. The difference between these
two manifestations relates to the transformations of the
role of the state. In early modernity the state assumed
authority over large territories and populations, includ-
ing many disparate communities, which had until then
maintained their own, decentralised ways of governing
their affairs and continued to adhere to their normative
practices despite the establishment of central state
authority. At that stage, legal pluralism is seen as a
problem of ‘too little law’ in the sense that the state
imposes its authority on all these other legal orders. In
the globalised world this authority of the state subsides
and the problem becomes one of ‘too much law’. New
forms of interaction on a global scale and the emergence
or expansion of transnational normative orders, some
related to the sovereign state (e.g. the EU) and some not
(e.g. lex mercatoria), coexist on the same level of authori-
ty and create numerous puzzles of normative coordina-
tion.
There is, of course, a wide and ever expanding range of
ways of thinking about legal pluralism. Without mean-
ing to provide a survey of such theories here,2 let me
classify them under three broad archetypical headings.
1. I refer to ‘early modernity’ not chronologically but substantively and
with specific focus on the political and the emergence of states. I regard
this as capturing colonial and post-colonial contexts.
2. For such surveys see indicatively B.Z. Tamanaha, ‘Understanding Legal
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global’, 30 Sydney Law Review 3, at
375-411 (2008).
173
Emmanuel Melissaris ELR December 2013 | No. 3/4
First, there are sociological and anthropological
accounts of legal pluralism. These focus on observing
and recording the ways in which various communities of
people are governed by practices of rule-following.
There is a long tradition of such studies of legal plural-
ism and they have taught us a great deal about the rich-
ness of the nomic world. The approach, however, has a
serious limitation (though perhaps not everyone consid-
ers it to be a limitation). A collection of observations of
phenomena of governance does not amount to a theory
of law, pluralist or otherwise. And such a foundational
theory is in fact prior to and always underlies and to
some extent guides sociological or anthropological
observation.3
The second, and more recent, approach to legal plural-
ism focuses on the proliferation of legal institutions and
the problem of coordination of various sources of
authority.4 The main question here is how to make
sense of the fact that, in a new environment of global-
ised communication and interaction, we are subject to a
variety of legal orders (transnational law, international
law, customary cross-boundary law and so forth). In
subscribing to a specific institutional conception of law
this theoretical approach is at least clear as to what needs
coordinating and it is therefore better placed to suggest
ways of reducing the complexity of the legal universe.
But this is at the same time its limitation. Manifestations
of legality, which do not meet this particular description
of institutions, will fall through the cracks of the theory.
A third way of trying to make sense of legal pluralism is
to work out a conception of law, which will be inclusive
of as many possible manifestations of law as possible
and, at the same time, capable of determining what the
object of enquiry is. I have advanced such an approach
to the question of legal pluralism elsewhere, and I still
find it plausible and useful as a way of understanding
law generally and legal pluralism in particular.5 Howev-
er, there is still something important that needs to be
explored, and this is whether this take on law and legal
pluralism is in a position to account for the possibility of
normative coordination of dispersed legal orders with-
out overdetermining the content of law and thus under-
mining the pluralist character of the theory.6 What I
want to do in this article is explore whether the theory
of legal pluralism that I have been defending can estab-
lish the possibility of normative communication
3. There is a wealth of studies of this kind. An important publishing outlet
for anthropological legal pluralist work is The Journal of Legal Pluralism
and Unofficial Law.
4. Some examples of this approach to legal pluralism include: N. Walker,
‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 Modern Law Review 3, at
317-359 (2002); N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism the Pluralist
Structure of Postnational Law (2011); P.S. Berman, Global Legal Plural-
ism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (2012).
5. E. Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal
Pluralism (2009).
6. Klaus Günther has attempted to address this issue by appealing to a
meta-law, which will include certain fundamental rights. K. Günther,
‘Rechtspluralismus und universaler Code der Legalität: Globalisierung als
rechtstheoretisches Problem’, in L. Wingert and K. Günther (eds.), Die
öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der öffentlichkeit (2001),
at 539.
between legal orders without prejudicing the outcome of
this communication.
For the sake of simplicity I will refer to this specific take
on law and legal pluralism as ‘legal pluralist theory’
– without of course implying that it is the only possible
way of making sense of legal pluralism – and I will gen-
erally refer to the fact of legal pluralism as ‘legal plural-
ism’. I will begin by unpacking the basic tenets of the
theory and then explore its implications.
2.1 Why a Conception of Law?
Legal pluralist theory takes on board the observations of
those who record the apparent intertwining or clashes of
what seem to be distinct legal orders as prima facie evi-
dence that law is not necessarily reduced to the state. It
also takes seriously the intuition that such clashes are
due to law’s situatedness in time and space. But it also
acknowledges that if these observations are to be accom-
panied by the stronger claim that the fact of legal plural-
ism is distinctive and irreducible to value pluralism or
institutional pluralism and that it complicates the nor-
mative universe in a novel way, more has to be done
than simply recording the phenomenology of either of
the two manifestations of legal pluralism. Legal pluralist
theory therefore takes a step back. It asks what the ana-
lytical conditions of legal pluralism and what the neces-
sary entailments of law’s situatedness are. And, in a
move that dissatisfies those who find it impossible to
overcome the mental block of necessarily associating law
with the state, these questions are cast as an enquiry into
the concept of law tentatively so called, an enquiry into
the legal character of various actually existing normative
orders. It is only by clarifying the conditions of exis-
tence of the legal that it will be possible to work out
precisely why legal pluralism raises a challenge to our
current understanding of law and why legal pluralism
cannot be shrugged off as a type of pluralism that can be
negotiated and reduced within state law.
To understand why this is important, consider the fol-
lowing. Mainstream, monist legal theories generally
hold law’s special character as perhaps framing the
question of legitimacy but not as necessary to it. This
holds both for those who dissociate the question of law’s
validity from law’s legitimacy and for those who link
them as a matter of necessity. They both consider state
law as uniquely capable of serving social integration by
incorporating and enforcing values, which are accepta-
ble – on whichever grounds – by all. For instance,
empiricist legal positivism of the Benthamite-Hartian
tradition may acknowledge value pluralism.7 It may also
accept – although no legal positivist explicitly does so –
legal pluralism in its weak sense, as it does not rule out
the existence of legal orders, which do not share all the
7. J. Bentham, Of Laws in General, edited by H.L.A. Hart (1970); H.L.A.
Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edn (1994). The same goes for political
theories, which try to deal with value pluralism and, in one way or
another, espouse the positivist conception of law. For Rawls, for exam-
ple, everything becomes visible once participants have exited the Origi-
nal Position. Therefore the law of the state structures normative com-
mitments, which are perfectly visible from all perspectives. See J. Rawls,
Political Liberalism (1993).
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characteristics of the focal case of state law. But it is not
prepared to accept legal pluralism in the stronger sense,
because it considers the conditions of existence of these
legal orders to be visible from any perspective. The legal
universe is transparent for Hart and the term ‘law’ has
no substantive implications in relation to the question of
how these legal orders may be coordinated. For natural
law theories in all their variants8 things are even more
straightforward, as they do not acknowledge either value
pluralism or legal pluralism other than as a plurality of
mistaken beliefs.
Therefore, all mainstream legal theories could readily
argue that, even if some communities of people maintain
their own normative practices, the question is whether
these regimes are compatible with the values that apply
to all and that animate central, state law. If so, they can
be treated as qualified exceptions, but the crucial point
is that they will still be sanctioned by central, state law.
To rebut this objection, legal pluralist theory must show
that there is something in the character of these norma-
tive orders that complicates in a novel way the legitima-
cy discourse. It is this character that legal pluralist theo-
ry terms as ‘legal’ and tries to tease out.
There is an assumption implicit in this foundational
thesis concerning the aims of legal theory generally.
Legal pluralist theory is premised on the view that the
end point of every enquiry into the legal is practical.9
What is ultimately at stake is to work out the conditions
under which large, and diverse, groups of people in the
here and now can coexist by governing their affairs in a
way that is acceptable by all. For this to be possible,
nothing should be excluded from the discourse of legiti-
macy conceptually from the very outset. The label ‘law’
has significant consequences for the lives of those who
are born in a society governed by law and who often do
not consciously choose to be subject to legal obligations,
obligations that are purportedly justifiably enforced pre-
cisely because they are legal. Therefore, hastily reserving
‘law’ exclusively for state-centred normative orders,
maintaining categories that emerged as a result of the
political domination of the state and still ascribing nor-
mative significance to such distinctions potentially
(whether this is in fact the case can only be ascertained
at the end of the enquiry) obscures matters and distorts
the legitimation process.
2.2 What Kind of Conception of Law?
In order to show that there is something in the legal
quality of a normative order that has an effect on the
question of legitimacy, legal pluralist theory must pro-
duce a conception of law. Such a conception is not in
any way independent of our actual practices and experi-
ences. Indeed, it would be inconsistent for it to be so,
because of the very starting hypothesis of legal pluralist
8. See characteristically J.M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd
edn (2011); R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011).
9. This is not to say that every single enquiry into the legal is practical.
Description is possible and, indeed, necessary. However, even accurate
description of our normative practices is at best incomplete if it does not
service the practical discussion of legitimacy.
theory, namely that there is something about the social
situatedness of law that accounts for the incompatibility
between its different instances. At the same time, it is
not bound to local contexts. But the requirement of
immanence does not mean that it is impossible to for-
mulate an abstract conception of law with some degree of
generality. One may do this by abstracting from observ-
able manifestations of social normativity and by singling
out some characteristics that appear to be uncontrover-
sial and shared across instances of social normativity. I
consider this to be a by and large constructivist concep-
tion of law.
The legal pluralist conception of law must be able plau-
sibly to capture legal pluralism. It should therefore be
stripped of historical contingencies – such as attachment
to certain sources – so as to encompass as wide a range
as possible of phenomena of social normativity, which
appear to display the same basic characteristics despite
their differences in the trimmings.
The constructivist and highly general and abstract
nature of this conception of law has certain important
features:
i. It is inevitably minimalist. If we discount contin-
gent historical factors, it is very few commonalities
that it will be possible to single out.
ii. It raises the interconnected claims to formality and
neutrality. That it is formal does not mean that it
is not historically indexed. In other words, it is not
to say that the legal pluralist conception of law
claims that it is possible to draw the framework of
legality in an a-contextual way. In that sense it is
not neutral because it could be otherwise in radi-
cally different contexts. But it is neutral in the
more salient sense of drawing law’s outer bounda-
ries in a way that will not determine law’s content.
In fact, not remaining neutral is not an option for
legal pluralist theory. This follows from the pre-
suppositions of engaging in enquiry into the con-
ditions of law in the first place. Taking an interest
in the regulatory regimes of others already presup-
poses that the observer holds the group under
observation as capable of setting, applying and fol-
lowing rules to govern their coexistence and that
they are not prey to coercion or other external (or
internal but unmediated by reason) pressures, over
which they cannot exercise any control. Recognis-
ing this capacity to respond to rules has a central
practical consequence: it obligates the enquirer to
form her enquiry in a way that will not usurp or
undermine that capacity of the groups under
observation. And the only way of doing so is by
starting from as thin a sense of law as possible,
without furnishing it with any content.
Some doubt that it is even possible to formulate a
formal and neutral account of law and, even if it is
possible, they argue that it is of no merit. Both
these objections are backed by the argument that
law is all about reasons, and therefore as soon as
you speak about law you already select a set of rea-
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sons for which to have law, to have a specific type
of law and so forth.10 I do not want to rekindle this
discussion here, but it is worth saying two things.
First, legal pluralist theory does not have to deal
with the question of whether it is possible to give a
neutral account of reasons for action because at the
stage of observation it does not even ask what these
reasons are.11 And giving a purely formal account
of the observable manifestations of actual norma-
tive practices seems perfectly possible precisely
because they are actual social practices.12 So there
will of course be reasons backing practices of social
rule-following by situated agents, but one does not
have to consider these reasons simply to say that
law manifests itself as social rule-following by situ-
ated agents.
Is such a formal account of law of any merit? One
might think that it is not only if one believes that
legal reasons do not depend in any way on the atti-
tudes of those who act on them. One might think
that the way in which a community of people holds
reasons to apply to them is perfectly visible from
the observer’s standpoint because there can be no
contingent variations in our beliefs about how rea-
sons apply. Or one might think, as many do, that
how reasons in fact apply to us and therefore what
makes for good or bad law, has nothing to do with
our beliefs at all and is instead a matter of tran-
scendental truth. Legal pluralist theory, of course,
does not have to accept either of these views. The
former is mistaken because beliefs are context-sen-
sitive and therefore at least potentially opaque.
The latter because the starting hypothesis of legal
pluralist theory is precisely that there is something
about the situatedness of law, which frames the
legitimation process differently. And should this
hypothesis be proven right, then, as I shall show
later, it will have to be accepted even by those who
think of reasons as agent- or context-independent.
10. See characteristically J.M. Finnis, ‘Law and What I Truly Should Decide’,
48 American Journal of Jurisprudence, at 107 (2003); R. Dworkin,
‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Legal Philosophy’, 24 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 1 (2004). For a comprehensive response
see A. Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’,
26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4, at 683 (2006).
11. Incidentally, it seems to me to be plainly wrong to say that it is impossi-
ble for one to describe the actions of others as well as the reasons that
justify these actions without one endorsing these reasons. Imagine, for
example, that the Dworkinian Judge Hercules or the Finnisian perfectly
enlightened moral/legal person gives you, an outsider, an account of
their law and the reasons behind it. Reproducing that account accurate-
ly by substituting the first person singular with the third person (e.g.
‘Judge Hercules believes […]’) is quite obviously possible and neutral.
Now, absent such idealisations in the real world, it will clearly be more
difficult to select the set of reasons that all participants would agree ani-
mate the point of their practice, but this is not to say that it is impossi-
ble.
12. Dworkin questions this and argues that law should be considered an
‘integrated’ value alongside liberty, equality and the like. This, however,
is to disregard that law is necessarily something that groups of people
do; it is a practice that can be described prior to and independently of
considering the normative meaning that the participants in the practice
ascribe to it. See Dworkin (2004), above n. 10.
iii. Legal pluralist theory of law is fully aware of the
falsifiability of its conception of law. Uncontrover-
sial as the formal generalisation of our practices
may appear prima facie, it cannot be precluded that
it may fail to capture phenomena that seem to be
doing the same kind of work in social life. If so,
then it must be revised so as to improve its explan-
atory potential. Whether this is the case cannot be
revealed before beginning to apply the formal con-
ception of law to specific contexts. And, as I shall
show a little later in this article, this application
can only happen by substantively engaging with
other legal communities.
iv. The scope of what counts as law is drawn rather
wide. Legal pluralist theory does not discriminate
a priori between what we customarily refer to as
‘law’, by and large state law, and other social nor-
mative orders. Legal pluralist theory thus departs
from mainstream legal theory, which in one way or
another relies heavily on the assumption that the
term law is reserved for the normative order sanc-
tioned by the modern state. It also puts to the test
the resulting distinctions between normative
orders, which bracket off everything that does not
stem from the state as ‘social’, ‘associational’ and
so on conceptual rather than substantive grounds.
Some may regard the conflation of such conven-
tionally established distinctions as unnecessarily
revisionist.13 Contrary to this, I consider it to be a
significant virtue of legal pluralist theory. This is
because, as I argued earlier, nothing should be
excluded from the outset on conceptual grounds.
It is only if we begin wide that we will be able to
see the parameters of the legitimacy discourse.
2.3 Which Conception of Law?
So far I have outlined why it is necessary for a legal plu-
ralist theory to proceed on the basis of some conception
of law and the general features of such a conception. I
will now begin to outline its content.
2.3.1 Law, Social Acceptance, Reasons
I consider it uncontroversial that in its manifestations
law can be described as an instance of collectiverule-fol-
lowing by temporally and spatially situated agents. By
rule-following I do not necessarily mean that law neces-
sarily fits the mould of what we are familiar with in con-
stituted, congruent legal systems, i.e. a system of inscri-
bed rules stemming from identifiable sources. What I
mean is that law necessarily consists in ought-proposi-
tions, which are external to each agent and require the
exercise of agents’ will for their application. Therefore,
law will always be at least translatable as such ought-
13. Simon Roberts has forcefully argued against this conflation of conven-
tional categories. See S. Roberts, ‘After Government? On Representing
Law Without the State’, 68 Modern Law Review 1, at 1 (2005); S. Rob-
erts, ‘Against Legal Pluralism’, 42 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unof-
ficial Law, at 95 (1998).
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propositions, even when it is manifested differently, e.g.
as symbols or artefacts.14
I take it that this much is immediately obvious even on a
quick observation of our practices of law, and this is
why I take it to be uncontested. What may be contested
is whether rules have the capacity to guide our actions at
all. Some doubt that they do, and so they invite us to
revisit our whole understanding of normativity. They
may well be right. It may be the case that certain facts in
the world trigger some physiological reaction in us,
which explains the convergence of our patterns of
behaviour. Nevertheless, what is crucial for our under-
standing of law is that we experience law as a set of rules
establishing obligations and we judge our acts as con-
forming or not with law’s dictates. It is this way in
which law is inscribed in our consciousness that I take to
be uncontroversial and that I consider the central con-
cern of legal theory, i.e. the attempt at grasping our nor-
mative practices.15
Since law is a rule-following practice, it clearly consists
in more than just coercing people to act in a certain way.
Law must be capable of guiding people’s actions; it
must be such that people are given the opportunity to
follow it. This entails that law must be capable of gener-
ating obligations on the part of its addressees. On the
surface level, this has to do with what many have poin-
ted out, namely that law must make demands of people,
which can be properly met only by exercising one’s will,
and which are expressed in, or translatable into, norma-
tive language, which is the language of obligation.16
There is hardly any need to say more on this at this
stage, although a little later I will return to another cen-
tral entailment of the requirement of law being capable
of guiding its addressees’ actions.
Now, law being capable of generating obligations does
not suffice. It must in fact generate obligations. What
does this mean? The question is generally posed as a
dilemma between social and justified normativity. On
the former view, law’s normativity depends on the
acceptance on the part of its addressees as binding.
According to the latter view, legal obligation is agent-
independent. We are under genuine legal obligations
only to the extent that there are good and belief-inde-
pendent reasons, including reasons for having law in the
first place, grounding these obligations.
Both these views conflate two separate questions. On
the one hand, there is the question of what accounts for
the very possibility of normativity. On the other hand,
there is the question of the conditions of existence of
law. Once we disambiguate these two questions, we will
see that both the social acceptance and the reason-
dependence views are correct but on different levels.
14. For an argument to the contrary, although with special reference to reli-
gion, see S.N. Balagangadhara, ‘The Heathen in His Blindness …’: Asia,
the West, and the Dynamic of Religion (2005).
15. Alain Supiot forcefully, and I think convincingly, displays the dangers in
not fully recognising this nature of law in Homo Juridicus: On the
Anthropological Function of the Law (2007).
16. See Hart’s account in The Concept of Law, above n. 7.
For there to be law the participants in a legal practice
must have accepted it as generating obligations. This is
because of law’s character as social rule-following by sit-
uated agents. For there to be a legal order, therefore, a
normative order that has an impact on participants’ lives
by structuring their normative expectations, the beliefs
of those participants regarding the normative status of
law must converge. But this does not necessarily amount
to saying that generalised beliefs regarding the norma-
tive force of law suffice for law to generate any true obli-
gations. In other words, to say that for there to be law
there must be a convergence of beliefs is to say some-
thing about the necessary sociological conditions of exis-
tence of law and not about the nature of normativity.
One might therefore question, as natural lawyers and
others typically do, whether our psychological attitudes
can generate obligations. One might argue that people
might hold mistaken beliefs and consider themselves to
be under obligations, which are not true because they do
not comply with some prior and agent-independent
obligations derivable from and/or accessible by reason.
But even those holding that view must accept that in
order for there to be law – and it is worth emphasising
the social practice character of law once again – its
addressees must accept those ‘true’ obligations as bind-
ing. In other words, whether an obligation is genuine or
not by some extra-legal standard does not have to do
with whether it is a legal obligation. ‘True’ obligations
can become legal only if they are so recognised and
accepted.17
None of this is to suggest that law must be efficacious or
substantively accepted and legitimate, in order for it to
be law at all. What I mean by social acceptance is only
the sense of recognition, on the part of its addressees, of
the law’s binding nature. Law will be efficacious only if
its subjects in fact, and for whatever reason, act in the
way that law expects them to. The requirement of social
acceptance qua recognition is also different to law’s
legitimacy understood as actual acceptance or as accept-
ability. One might think that the law is legitimate to the
extent that its addressees are motivated or compelled by
the same reasons, which ground the law.18 But recognis-
ing law as binding does not entail endorsing it in that
way. Therefore, social acceptance of law as binding
guarantees neither the law’s efficacy nor its legitimacy.
It is, however, entailed by, and is therefore a threshold
condition for, both efficacy19 and legitimacy qua accept-
ability.
This already takes us to the reason-dependent view of
law’s normativity. Although general belief convergence
is necessary for there to be law, viewed from the stand-
17. This objection is customarily raised against Hart. It is justified to do so
because Hart did not clearly differentiate between the two questions
that I single out here and tended to conflate the question of the condi-
tions of existence of law with the nature and sources of normativity.
18. Clearly, law may be efficacious, say due to the ferocity of its enforce-
ment, but still not be legitimate.
19. I mean efficacy as law. If, say, the addressees of law simply happen to
act in the way that the law requires them to, then it cannot properly be
said that that law is effective as law.
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point of each participant, law is not merely accepted in
that thin manner. It is accepted as binding on the basis
of reasons; reasons for having law, for having a specific
type of law and for the law having specific content. To
illustrate the difference between the participant accept-
ing the law on the basis of reasons and the fact of recog-
nition/acceptance, consider this: Say A has good rea-
sons to ϕ. This does not entail that A accepts a rule
according to which ‘you ought to ϕ’ as binding. But if
A does accept that rule as binding, then A will be doing
so on the basis of reasons and not unreflectively. Not all
participants will always consciously employ these rea-
sons, but, when pressed to reflect on the matter, they
will only be able to explain legal obligation on the basis
of reasons. They may also not all accept law for the same
reasons. Note, however, once again that the convergence
on the same reasons does not have to do with whether
there is law but with whether the law is legitimate or
stable. If the reasons grounding the law are rationally
and reasonably acceptable by its addressees in abstracto,
then the law will count as legitimate. If they are accepta-
ble and accepted in concreto, i.e. in light of actual condi-
tions in the legal community, then the law will also be
stable in the long run.
2.3.2 The Justification Requirement
The fact that law is not about sheer coercion or mere
physical responses to stimuli unmediated by reason
entails that law’s addressees are capable of following
rules, which prioritise certain reasons for action over
others. This in turn means that law’s addressees are
capable of responding to reasons, of hierarchising them
and of being motivated by them. And given that law is
an instance of social rule-following, the same assumption
holds for everyone who is a participant in the practice of
law.
These presuppositions have one important implication
for the attitudes of participants in law. When one pur-
ports to be saying anything in law or, to phrase it differ-
ently, when one makes a legal judgment in any context
either institutional or not, one simultaneously claims
that one’s addressees, i.e. the rest of the participants in
law, recognise that judgment as potentially binding and
as containing reasons to which they can respond. To
raise such a claim means to be able to defend it, and to
defend normative claims means to justify them. And the
social character of law, which, as I have argued, means
that the participants’ attitude is central to the existence
of law, entails that the claim is raised to the potential
participants in that manifestation of the legal.20
The fact that law is backed by reasons and that claims in
law are always claims to the best possible reasons and
are potentially addressed to all participants in law does
not necessarily entail that one is under a duty to provide
20. Who the potential participants are depends largely on actual contexts.
Clearly, in the real world, some jurisdictional division will be required,
which will place reasonable constraints to the scope of legal claims. But
how jurisdiction is to be set is a substantive matter, which cannot be
settled by the concept of law alone but can only be deferred to the
stage of its application.
such reasons and to defend them to others. Some, like
natural lawyers and interpretivists, believe that legal
reasons are agent-independent and that whether one
appreciates them or not has nothing to do with whether
they apply to one. For those holding this view there may
be other reasons for giving full justificatory accounts,
say stability or transparency, but these reasons are
entirely contingent.21 In what follows I will show that
under a pluralist conception of law, one is always expec-
ted to publicly defend such reasons. But first I must
make the argument for law’s relative closure.
2.3.3 Normative Intelligibility and the Possibility of
Legal Pluralism
So far I have argued that for there to be law, i.e. social
rules that govern groups of people in real contexts in
space and time, these rules must be regarded as binding
by the people. Whether these obligations are genuine
according to some substantive theory of morality is sec-
ondary in relation to the question whether there is law
in the sense that without acceptance there can be no law
even if there are good reasons applying to agents. But
for law to be normatively accepted, it must be norma-
tively intelligible, it must purport to guide participants’
actions in a way that they can make sense of.
Since social acceptance is necessary for its existence, law
is normatively intelligible only to the extent that it taps
into beliefs shared by its addressees regarding the possi-
ble normative meaning of the world.22 Law requires a
commonly recognised terrain of normative possibility,
which is determined by people’s normative perceptions
of the world, such as their normative perceptions of
time, space and connections between events. It requires
a background of shared perceptions of how the world
may be changed through their normative commitments.
Given that it addresses temporally and spatially situated
agents, law’s normative intelligibility must rest on the
merging of the practical and the theoretical manifesting
itself as implicitly or explicitly shared beliefs – what I
have elsewhere called shared normative experiences.23
We should be careful here not to confuse this with a
fully fledged naturalistic thesis regarding reasons or oth-
er possible understandings of the relationship between
fact and norm. That participants in law must hold such
beliefs for there to be law is not to say that facts in the
world actually have inherent normative meaning. Nei-
ther is it tantamount to the self-evident fact that norms
are applied to facts and that there must be some rough
epistemological consensus as to the meaning of these
facts, in order for norm-application to be largely uncon-
troversially possible and stable. Nor is normative intelli-
gibility the same as the scope of applicability of norms
21. This seems to be Dworkin’s take on democracy. See R. Dworkin, Is
Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate
(2006). For a critique consistent with the argument in this article, see E.
Melissaris, ‘A Social and Legal Theory of Re-enchantment: Interpreti-
vism, Argumentation, and the Law’, 19 Constellations 4, at 609 (2012).
22. My argument here is a variation on a theme. See particularly R. Cover,
‘Nomos and Narrative’, 97 Harvard Law Review, at 4 (1983-1984);
Supiot, above n. 15.
23. Melissaris (2009), above n. 5.
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or the genuine content of values. In order for partici-
pants in a legal community to meaningfully disagree on
such matters of application they must already share a
horizon of normative possibility, which determines what
is normatively imaginable and what is not.
Very importantly, how these beliefs are generated and
evolve depends on their actual context. Precisely
because they are beliefs about the normative significance
of the world for participants’ coexistence, they are not
static but dynamic and constantly changeable. They
may be tacitly transformed through the ways in which
social relations and collective relations between partici-
pants and the environment change with time. They may
also be determined and change self-reflexively. The
consolidation of some of them as a set of rules of bind-
ing force may create a coherent system, which is rela-
tively closed and sets the criteria of normative possibili-
ty, thus accordingly shaping participants’ beliefs. This,
however, is not to say that shared normative experiences
are exclusively systemically determined and that they
cannot be put to the test by those who hold them. Like
all beliefs it is possible for one to question them in light
of new information and through processes of self-reflec-
tion.
Highlighting the fact that law relies on such jurisgenera-
tive24 commitments does not give the latter any specific
content. This content will vary depending on the con-
text of emergence and development of shared normative
experiences and the type of law that they enable. There-
fore a full understanding of these particular conditions
of legality can only be formed from the perspective of
the participants and their self-understanding of their
practices. This is what accounts for law’s potential
autonomy and relative closure, which has at least two
important aspects. First, from the perspective of the
observer and without the experience and understanding
of the terrain of normative intelligibility, one cannot
make full sense of legal rule-following as such. It follows
that one will not be able to know with certainty all the
manifestations of legality available out there. Secondly,
one can be a participant in an instance of such social/
legal rule-following only if and to the extent that one
already partakes in this communal understanding of the
normative meaning of the world.
This does not mean that law becomes an impenetrable
system inaccessible by others. To be sure, non-partici-
pants will not be in a position to endorse participants’
shared normative experiences, because they do not form
part of their belief system. But shared normative experi-
ences can be explained and communicated by partici-
pants to non-participants in a way that the latter can
form some understanding of the insiders’ perspective.
Such communication can, especially given the revisabil-
ity of normative experiences, trigger a process of self-
reflection by both parties, which may then, given the
right conditions, lead to a mutual understanding and
convergence or mutual acceptance.
24. This is an allusion to Robert Cover. See n. 22 above.
So a new conception of law’s facticity emerges, and
along with it the possibility of legal pluralism is
revealed. The differentia specifica of law ceases to be its
association with a source or the rightness of its content
in compliance to some transcendental moral order but
rather its dependence on the way that the participants in
it make sense of the world in its normative meaning.
Since this experience is bound to the context law can
emerge in any context in which normative social rela-
tions emerge. The dynamic nature and multivariation of
these contexts account for the immense complexity and
untidiness of the legal universe. For instance, although
in some of its manifestations law will be systematised in
an arguably coherent whole, that is the conception of
law with which we are more familiar, in others it will
not be so. And, although we can never be outside law, it
is perfectly possible that we are subject to different
instances. The same agent may find herself participating
in a, unique to her, variety of legal orders.
Does all this mean that legal pluralism in its stronger
sense, not only the existence of social normative orders
independently of the state – for which patterns of social
acceptance can provide an indication – but the existence
of closed non-state social normative orders, is a fact?
Not necessarily. But its possibility cannot be ruled out a
priori. One cannot know from a philosophical or an
observer’s empirical perspective whether one deals with
normative experiences, which one does not share,
whether one oversteps one’s own terrain of normative
intelligibility or trying to impose as binding onto others
something that they find unintelligible. But, as I shall
argue in the following section, the very character of law
allows for some communication between legal orders.
3 Reducing Legal Pluralism
The wheel is about to come full circle, but let us take
stock before moving on. I have argued so far that the
idea of law itself, as an instance of collective rule-follow-
ing by temporally and spatially situated agents, entails
the following: first, each time one claims to be making a
legal utterance, one claims that all the participants in
law are capable of being bound by it, in fact bound by it
and capable of being motivated by it (though not neces-
sarily are in fact). Secondly, law consists in shared nor-
mative experiences, which make it normatively intelligi-
ble to start with. Thirdly, that law projecting itself
against the background of normative intelligibility
accounts for legal pluralism both in the sense that law is
not necessarily bound to the state but may emerge in
any context as well as in the sense that these instances of
law are potentially closed and invisible to the observer.
I should also note again that my focus is on complex,
differentiated societies, in which integration through
rule-following is not possible on the basis of personal
recognition and communication. In such contexts
diverse legal orders encounter each other constantly and
in a variety of unpredictable ways. This untidiness of
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the modern legal universe makes it imperative that we
think carefully about the possibility of meaningful com-
munication between such legal orders.
What I have argued so far has several ramifications.
Centrally, every attempt at law-making must be based
on justification, that is the giving of clear and openly
available reasons. Now, one who regards law as subordi-
nate to transcendental, agent-independent reasons
would leave it at that and not require anything else for
law to indeed be law. But recognising the possibility of
legal pluralism forces one not only to be prepared to jus-
tify legal claims on the basis of reasons but also to
ensure that all those potentially affected will have the
opportunity from their perspective to assess the intelli-
gibility of how they are required to act and to be able to
voice their disagreement. Otherwise, one runs the risk
of failing to do law altogether, because one would be
expecting others to follow rules, which they are not in a
position to follow. So, to make the same point from a
different angle, all attempts at making law must first
deal with the risk of legal pluralism.
The conditions of normative intelligibility can be clari-
fied and communicated across standpoints only through
dialogue, which I have elsewhere termed interperspecti-
val.25 And the more complex the nexus of beliefs form-
ing and surrounding the terrain of normative intelligi-
bility, the more far-reaching that dialogue must be.
Does all this have any substantive ramifications,
though? Or is it the case that one can do law by simply
asking all those in the sphere of validity of law to tick
boxes in a sociological survey stating whether what that
law requires of them is intelligible or not?
As I have said, from the first-person singular, law is not
simply a matter of neutral acceptance but a matter of
responding to reasons. Once within the practice of law,
questions regarding the law are necessarily practical, not
theoretical. Therefore, when a participant, i.e. someone
who is expected to abide by the law, is asked whether a
certain legal regulation is normatively intelligible, she is
not simply asked whether that regulation coheres with
her belief systems. She is asked whether she can endorse
that regulation and its justification, whether it coheres
with her normative commitments, the reasons on which
she is inclined to act. To illustrate, the question is not
only ‘does the obligation to ϕ make sense to you?’ but
also ‘ought you to ϕ?’.
Before concluding I should emphasise two things. It is
not unthinkable that at a given moment in the history of
a legal order, there may be law in the sense that it will be
fully normatively intelligible to all and so forth, without
this law having gone through the stage of deliberative
exchange of reasons and arguments. It could well so
happen that it all serendipitously falls into place. How-
ever, when one, or a group of people, claim to make law,
when they make specifically legal claims, which are
meant to apply to others than just them, then they are
bound by the entailments of what it means to do law.
This is a moral duty, which follows from engaging in a
25. Melissaris (2009), above n. 5.
practical activity of a certain kind. Seen from the per-
spective of law’s addressees, absent procedures of public
justification, they cannot be held to be under any duty
stemming from law. Secondly, none of this establishes a
duty to govern by law. This is because my analysis is not
premised on some metaphysical truth regarding rights
or duties that we may have prior to our actual practices,
but is heavily historically indexed. It is a construction of
the entailed requirements of in fact engaging in social
rule-following practices: if we are to be governed by law,
what will that entail?
The upshot of this is that the dialogue on normative
intelligibility and the alignment of normative experien-
ces, which is necessary for ascertaining whether law is
possible at all, is at the same stroke transformed into a
dialogue on legitimacy, that is on the substantive accept-
ability of public norms. Bringing all this together, it fol-
lows that in order to have law, such procedures must be
in place as to guarantee the exchange of views on rea-
sons, which everyone is prepared to accept. This is
already to establish that no law can be made without the
inclusion of all those who potentially participate in that
law. In other words, it is to establish a necessary link
between law and public justification and the general idea
that norm-determination, and this includes the norms
setting up the institutional procedural framework of col-
lective deliberation, must proceed on the basis of the
involvement of everyone affected by those norms.
My conclusion may not satisfy those who wish the idea
of law itself to provide thicker normative assurances
against attacks on human dignity, rights and so forth. I
am sceptical as to whether the concept of law alone can
offer such assurance. But it is also not as fragile as some
may fear. It can guarantee transparency and publicity
and open up the space for political deliberation. It also
protects from outright coercion and ensures inclusive-
ness. And note that the requirement of public justifica-
tion also has some further entailments, such as some
minimum requirements of the rule of law, but I cannot
outline these in this context. But this is where the theo-
ry of legal pluralism, in reality a general theory of law,
reaches its limit. It must then hand over to political
theory, which will work out the conditions of imple-
mentation of this foundational idea and furnish it with
substantive principles in actual contexts.
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